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Abstract
A new representation of malfunction procedure logic which permits the automation of these
procedures using Boolean normal forms is presented. This representation is discussed in the context
of the development of an expert system for Space Shuttle flight control including software and
• hardware implementation modes, and a distributed architecture, The roles and responsibility of the
flight control team as well as previous work toward the development of expert systems for flight
control support at Johnson Space Center are discussed. The notion of malfunction procedures as
graphs is introduced as well as the concept of hardware.equivalence.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present the preliminaryresults of work currently underway to
automate part of the Space ShuttleVehicle (SSV) flightcontrol team function throughthe application
of resultsfrom automata and sequential machine theory, and expert system research. Preliminary
applications have been developed based on these results using software tools developed for the
computer-aided design (CAD) of Very.Large Scale Integrated (VLSI) circuits and a high.level
language for the implementation of expert systems. Although developed specifically for the SSV, the
approach presented here appears to have application to the larger class of problems addressed by
control systems in general. The text describes the development of a data representation which
facilitates the automatic detection and resolution of anomalies occurring during SSV flight
operations, by introducing
1. a method for the translation to, and representation of malfunction procedures in Boolean
form,
2. the notion that malfunction procedures can be treated as graphs, and
3. the use of normal forms for the standardization of data structures to be used in computer
processing of the procedural information.
In addition to providing a data representation which will simplify software development and reduce
processor load with respect to previous approaches, we expect these improvements to
1.enhance the ability of the flight control team to detect and analyze anomalies faster and
to an extent greater than humanly possible. This is especially true for multiple dependent
failures; anomalies which are caused by one or more prior failures.
2. permit gradual transitioning from the current ground processing methods to an
increasingly automated and more distributed flight control system while preserving the
continuity and integrity of existing operational capabilities,
3. provide an environment designed to capture expert knowledge in machine-processable
form thereby preserving individual and collective expertise of the flight control team
members over time.
4. permit the arbitrary distribution of processing between the ground and the spacecraft as
well as between hardware and software.
The discussion will begin with a description of the organizational structure of the flight control team
and its responsibilities in SSV mission eperations. We shall then briefly discuss expert systems in
general terms before introducing a new representation for malfunction procedures using Boolean
logic. Following this will be a discussion of the application of VLSI design techniques used to derive,
from the Boolean representation, a disjunctive normal form matrix. The matrix representation
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enables the processing of malfunction procedures by either software (using an expert systems
approach) or conversion to hardware in the form of programmable logic arrays (PLAs). A short
discussion of the impact this methodology can have on overall system design for space operations
follows including the selective distribution of processing to support increased vehicle autonomy as
well as reduced life-cycle costs for ground operations.
1.1 Flight Control Team
Asdescribed in [22], the modus operandi of the flight control teamcan be summarized, with respect
to responsibilities and activities during the operations phase of a space shuttle flight, as follows:
1. The fundamental role of the flight control team is to monitor and analyze Space Shuttle
systems for anomalous behavior, to analyze anomalies when they occur, to determine
corrective action, and to coordinate this action with the flight crew.
2. Most of the data from which these determinations and analyses are made are based on
computer processed, telemetry data originating from sensors on-board the SSV and
transmitted to the ground processing system.
Table 1 provides an abbreviated list of activities for which the flight control team is responsible for
during an SSV mission.
1.1.1 Organizational Structure
The SSV flight control team is organized as a hierarchy as depicted in figure 1. This organization
reflects both the diversity and the discrete compartmentalization of SSV system disciplines. In
general, SSV flight operations and procedures reflect a high degree of structure and definition in that
they are:
1. precise :operational procedures are developed, tested, and reviewed under simulated
mission conditions to achieve high precision.
2. deterministic : the SSV is a well understood, although complex, finite system. On-board
computers and sensors provide telemetry data. These data in combination with SSV
system design information, make possible the determination of the global state of the
vehicle.
3. documented : Operational procedures are catalogued in printed form. SSV system
performance is analyzed in detail both during and after a mission. Problems and
corrective action (successful and unsuccessful) are reviewed and documented.
1.1.2 Task Complexity and System Reliability
The SSV is significantly more complex than prior United States manned space vehicles, primarily
due to high redundancy of vehicle subsystems and the implementation of designs which reduce
single point failures within any single subsystem. While. in terms of system design, subsystem
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Table 1: Flight Controller Functions
Flight Dynamics PrelaunchAnalysis
TrajectoryMonitoring
SpacecraftTracking
Aerodynamicsand Structures
MonitorOnboard NavigationState
SSVSystems PrelaunchAnalysis
ManageSpacecraftSystems
ConsumablesAnalysis
Fault Detectionand Isolation
Fault Recovery
SSVData Acquisition ManageCommunicationand DataSystems
ManageFlight Data
Payloads ManagePayloadActivities
ManagePayloadsand SupportEquipment
OperationsManagement PolicyMaking
Ground NetworkManagement
CoordinateCrewActivityPlan
LandingOperations
MedicalSupport
SupplementalTechnicalSupport
redundancy can greatly improve overall system reliability it also means that a system can have a
larger number of states. The number of states is directly proportional to the degree of redundancy.
The number and characteristics of these states must be known and considered in the analysis of
known or possible system or subsystem failures. In addition to the increase in complexity introduced
through redundancy, complexity is increased through the use of interdependent subsystems such
that failure of a single component can affect the performance of several different subsystems both
instantaneously, through total functional loss, and over time, through degraded performance. The
detection, isolation and correction of any fault in the SSV systems is extremely important in terms of
both crew safety and mission success. Not only is the detection and correction of real failures
necessary but, as pointed out in [25], to maximize system availability, unjustified system shutdown or
puIIdowns must also be minimized.
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Figu re 1: Flight Control Team Organization
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1.1.3 Analytic Tools
The detection, analysis and recovery of faults is the responsibility of the flight control team and the
flight crew. The principal tools available to flight controllers and crew to assist them in these tasks are
either pocket checklists (small binders designed to hold all the responses to any problem that
requires crew action within five minutes) or large books containing several hundred procedures, each
comprising instructions to be executed when a fault arises which does not require immediate
response. These more involved directions, known as malfunction procedu res (or simply, malfs) are
critical to accurate and speedy fault detection and isolation.
1.2 Malfunction Procedures
In the current method of fault isolation, the flight crew and flight control team consult malfunction
procedures and reach a conclusion based on selected telemetry measurements and on.board
observations of switch settings (i.e., the vehicle state). Similar procedures are used to reestablish full
or partial system or subsystem function once an anomaly has been analyzed.
1.2.1 Types of Procedures
Four basic types of malfunction procedures are used by the flight teams [18]. Although they serve
differing functions they are collectively referred to as malfunction procedures. While this work
focuses primarily on system or block malfunction procedures, the methods presented in this paper
are applicable to all of the types of procedures described below.
1. System or Block Malfunction Procedures: The system malfunction procedure is a
deterministic representation of yes/no questions and crew procedures in the block and
line format of a flow chart. This form ideally lends itself to expert systems-type programs
due to its rule-based, "if.then" tree structure. Figure 2 is a representative block
procedure.
2. Special Sbbroutines (SSR): These are procedures that are accessed by many
different malfunction procedures. Also, the SSR is in more of a checklist format in
contrast to the block type used in the system malfunction procedures. Figure 3 is a
representative SSR.
3. Failu re Recovery Procedures (FRP): The FRP is a non.deterministic procedure used
when a General Purpose Computer (GPC) failure has already been determined and
certain steps must be taken to reconfigure the orbiter to take advantage of any remaining
capability in the failed GPC. Normally. FRP's are lengthier than the other malfunction
procedures. Figure 4 is a representative FRP.
4. Super Malfs: The super malf acts as a transition aid from the checklist to the
malfunction procedure itself. These procedures must be executed within five minutes of
the annunciation of an alarm and are critical to crew and mission safety. The wording
and format are identical to the ORB PCL (orbit pocket checklist) carried by the flight
crew. Figure 5 is a representative pocket checklist procedure.
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1.2.2 Developmentof Malfunction Procedures
Eachmalfunctionprocedureis the productof hundredsof man-hoursof design,validation,and
verification.Typically,a malfunctionprocedureisinitiallydesignedbyoneor moreengineers.After
thebasicdesignhasbeendetermined,theprocedureisthencritiquedata 'desktop'reviewwherethe
malfunctionproceduresbookmanager,theauthorof the procedureandat leastone crewmember
reviewtheprocedureandcheckits feasibilityforuseon theSSV. Thenextstepisfor theprocedure
tobetestedbyusingboththeSingleSystemTrainer(SST)andtheShuttleMissionSimulator(SMS).
Boththe SST and the SMSprovidea simulatedSSV environmentin whichthe procedurecan be
tested.Inthisway,simulatedfailurescanbeinputintothesystemandcrewandflightteamresponse
totheprocedurecanbeevaluatedthroughintegratedsimulations.
2 Automation of Malfunction Procedures
1The factors which influence a decision to automate a task performed by a human are
straightforwardand implicitlydetermined by humanlimitationsand characteristics. Not surprisingly
thesefactors includespeed,accuracy, precision,complexity,andcost. While notall humanactivities
lendthemselvesto automation,where an activitywhich does exists,as is the case with malfunction
procedures,two fundamentalquestions mustbe addressed earlyin the process of automation. First,
what types of automata are available for use, and second, how shall the information and data
currently used by the human be represented for processing by those automata? Since we are only
considering programmable digital computers or their equivalent in this work, the ensuing discussion
will be limited to the selection and implementation of a methodology suitable for the representation,
on this class of automata, of the procedural logic embodied in malfunction procedures.
2.1 Expert Systems and the Representation Problem
Although no precise definition of an expert systemexists, a great deal has been writted about them.
A comprehensive review of the subject as well as the entire field of Artificial Intelligence can be found
in [2], Table 2 lists some of the more well-known expert systems with their particular application
domain and references. According to [2],
[expert} systems are most strongly characterized by their use of large bodies of domain
knowledge - facts and procedures, gleaned from human experts, that have proved useful
for solving typical problems in their domain.
Such systems differ from conventional programming in that they are intended as a general-purpose
aid to problem.solving within a particular domain as opposed to being dedicated to a particular
application within a domain. For example, an expert system might be used to determine which source
!
Sections 2 - 2 5 1 are adapted from [15]
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of tracking data is the most appropriate for use in updating a spacecraft state vector given the current
ground and vehicle status. A conventional computer program could then be used to perform the
computation from the source selected. A key problem in developing an effective expert system, as
pointed out by [24],
is how to represent and use the knowledge that human experts in these subjects
obviously possess and use. This problem is made more difficult by the fact that the expert
knowledge in ma.ny important fields is often imprecise, uncertain, or anecdotal (though
human experts use such knowledge to arrive at useful conclusions).
Function Domain System Reference
Diagnosis Medicine CASNET [32]
Medicine INTERNIST [26]
Medicine MYCIN [28]
Medicine PUFF [19]
Engineering SACON [4]
Geology PROSPECTOR [10]
Search Chemistry DENDRAL [12]
Chemistry SYNCHEM [14]
Problem Mechanics MECHO [6]
Solving and Programming PECOS [3]
Planning Configuring R1 [21]
Computers
Measurement Medicine VM [11]
Interpretation
Computer-aided Electronics SOPHIE [5]
Instruction Medicine GUIDON [7]
Knowledge Diagnosis TEIRESIAS [9]
Acquisition Diagnosis EMYCIN [29]
Diagnosis EXPERT [33]
System ROSIE [27]
Building AGE [23]
HEARSAY1II [1]
Table 2" Some Existing Expert Systems
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2.2 Rule-based Expert Systems
Rule-based systemsare attractive because of their modularity,uniformity and ability to express
human expert knowledge in a natural manner[2]. Expert knowledgecan frequentlybe expressedin
the form of IF-THEN relations; rule-based systems are designed to take advantage of this
, characteristic. In particular, IF-THEN information can be satisfactorily represented as production
rules. Production rules are a computational formalism which can be used to define relationships
among variables. The relationships are structured such that the satisfaction of preconditions, called
antecedents, produce results, called consequents. Antecedents and consequents are generally
expressed using symbolic variables and logical operators.
2.2.1 Production Rules and the Predicate Calculus
The use of production rules permits us to express some kinds of expert knowledge in a formal way
and aids in the articulation of that knowledge. This formalism is also well-suited to expression in
programming languages and in the first.order predicate calculus [24], [15]. The first-order predicate
calculus is based on first-order logic (FOL) which, as the name implies, is a formal system of logic,
Use of this system permits us to manipulate expert knowledge according to logical principles and to
obtain inferences from known rules. A powerful result of this approach is the ability to form
hypotheses (or theorems) and test (or prove) them as well as to ask questions about the validity and
satisfiability of subsets of rules [24]. The representation of malfunction procedures, or for that matter
any procedures, in the form of production rules is useful to us here for the following primary reasons:
1. It provides a standard, formal structure which is easily translated into programming
languages. A familiar example of this is the IF.THEN syntax of FORTRAN although more
sophisticated programming languages are generally used for implementation of rule.
based systems.
2. It is compatible with the constructs of first-order logic and therefore first-order predicate
calculus. These formalisms have desirable properties for the development of automatic,
rule-based deduction systems.
This paper does not address the application of FOL to malfunction procedures other than to point out
the suitability of the representation presented here to the techniques of FOL as well as some results
from abstract algebra. Our primary purpose here is to establish the equivalence of a logical
representation of procedural information to the existing representation of the same information on
paper and to point out the advantages of the logical representation. The subsequent discussion will
focus on some early work done at Johnson Space Center. and then discuss how procedural
information can be expressed using Boolean functions and describe two methods of implementing
this representation,
]3
2.3 Early Work on Systems for Flight Control
A few prototype systems were developed to examine the feasibility of automating malfunction
procedures. Thesesystemsprovideda good basisforexperimentationand gavethose involvedinthe
projectgood demonstrationtools. The initialthrustwasto pickdifferent malfunction proceduresfrom
variousSSV disciplinesand, bycodingthemin Fortran77, determinecommonalitiesin format,syntax,
logicalstructure,and so forth. The goal was to define a small family of logical operatorswith some
typeof logicalarray as operands. A minimum of onetype of operatorwas envisionedfor each of the
four types of malfunctionprocedures. Initialworkwasbegun in June, 1982 by analyzing the systems
drawingsof theSSV PressureControl System.(PCS)and constructingfunctiona//oss logic diagrams.
Bycombiningthedrawing, logicdiagram, andmalfunctionprocedurefor the PCS, EXPRES was born
in October, 1982. The malfunction procedureprovidedthe rule.basedlogic and interpretationof the
drawingand diagramsuppliedthe basisfor an extensivequery structure.
2.3.1 EXPRES
E×PRES served its purpose as a demonstrationtoot quite well, but had two major shortcomings.
First, EXPRES acted as if the only inputs it had were provided by human operators, whereas,
eventuallya systemwas hoped for which could be linkedto a data bus and thereby access vehicle
telemetrydirectly. In other words,the humanhadto do a large amount of data checking in order to
answerthe questionsposed by the procedure. A computershouldbeable to do the monitoringitself.
Secondly, since it was a demonstrationtool, EXPRES had the PCS malfunction procedure logic
procedura//y programmed or hard-coded. This meantthat if anothermalfunction procedurewere to
be implemente the EXPRES program would require modification. This type of maintenance and
modificationiscostlyand error-proneas wellas difficultto control.
2.3.2 CRYEX
In February of 1983, CRYEX, another demonstrationexpert system which used the cryogenic
hydrogen pressure malfunction procedure, was designed to remove one of the shortcomingsof
EXPRES. CRYEX differed from EXPRES in that CRYEX allowed the user to define the symptoms of
the problem prior to the program execution by changing the values of certain parameters. This
feature made the program act as if the computer were interfaced with a data bus thereby accessing
data directly from the vehicle. This showed that the computer could make many decisions without the
assistance of a human. It still had the disadvantage of being hard-coded, however.
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2.3.3 GENEX
Asa response to the second criticism, GENEXwas conceived. GENEXwas built as a generic expert
system operator. In other words, it was built to process any systems malfunction procedure.
Benefitting fromthe experience gained from EXPRESand CRYEX, GENEX proved more efficient and
shorter than the previous demonstration products but only partially realized its goal. The major
problem remained that each procedure had to be uniquely coded; therefore generalizing the
representation of the four types of procedures to reduce the complexity of the software was difficult.
2.3.4 Derived Requirements
Experience with EXPRES, CRYEX and GENEX resulted in the identification of a number of
requirementsfor an expert systemto be usedto supportthe flightcontrolteam. The systemshould
1. be basedon existingsystemdiagrams, proceduresand functionalloss diagramsand, to
the extentpossible,be traceable to thesesourcedocuments.
2. make maximaluse of telemetrydata to reduceoperatorinteractionwiththe system.
3. not require the integral hard-coding of SSVsubsystem logic.
2.4 Development of a Boolean Representation
To satisfy these requirements, the approach was developed that represented.the procedures as sets
of Boolean functions. Figure 6 depicts the relationship of the source document, the original
malfunction procedure, to its Boolean equivalent. Because the procedures are generalized as
Boolean functions, one can
1. apply the techniques of automata theory, switching theory and abstract algebra [30].
2. take advantage of two methods of implementation software and hardware, as depicted in
figure 6.
Our discussion of the first point will be relatively limited because much of this work is still in progress
[15]. With regard to the second point, not only does this approach provide a standard data structure
it also provides the system architect the ability to selectively migrate processing between software
and hardware using a single common representation, thereby offering tremendous flexibility in the
design, development, testing and implementation of automated malfunction procedures. One of the
malfunction procedures. CRYO 6.3a, has been implemented in both modes as a proof-of-concept
demonstration.
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System Malfunction Procedures
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Failure Recovery Procedures
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Antecedents I Consequents(63arhs) _> (63alhs)
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TelemetryData J
Figu re 6: Equivalent Representations of Procedural Information
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2.4.1 Malfunction Procedures as Graphs
The malfunction procedure itself can be thOUghtof as a directed graph or digraph, G=(KE), where
V= {_,1,_,2....._'k},a set of vertices and E is a set of arcs such that eachelement of E is an ordered pair of
vertices, (vi,vi+l). An arc from _'i to _'i+zcan be denoted as vi_vi+ 1[16]. In this terminology the
boxes in the malfunction procedure are vertices, and the connecting lines represent arcs. A path in
the graph is a sequence of vertices _,i,v:....._'k. k>l, such that an arc, (Vi"-)1,i+1), exists for each i,
1<_.i< k. The path is said to be from vi to rk. For any vertex, _'in a path, vertices _.. j< i are referred
to as predecessors of _,_.while vertices }'k, k>i are the successors of _'i, The numbering of the
vertices used here should not be confused with the numbers used to name the boxes in the
malfunction procedure. The numbering of the vertices is used to indicate order; the numbering of the
boxes is used as identification and not necessarily order. An interesting note is that malfunction
procedures are not trees. As defined in [16], a tree is a digraph with the properties that:
1. There exists a vertex, the root, without predecessors, from which there is a path to every
vertex.
2. Each vertex other than the root has exactly onepredecessor.
3. The successors of each vertex are ordered from the left.
Malfunction procedures fail to satisfy properties two and three, as seen in figure 2. We introduce the
concept of graphs here to permit us to be more precise in our subsequent discussion as well as to
establish the groundwork for the application of other analytical methods.
2.4.2 Generation of Boolean Functions
The translation of block malfunction procedures to Boolean functions is straightforward. Failure
Recovery Procedures (FRP) present a somewhat less direct translation but are nonetheless
convertible to the representation described below for block malfunction procedures. As an example,
consider the following expression:
63a9 = 63alcA ~ 6.,a_A ~ 6.,a5A 63a8 (1)
Referring to figure 2, note the heavily bordered box labelled with the number, 9, in the upper left-hand
corner of the box. This box, as do others with the heavy black border, represents a termination or
diagnostic state within the procedure. When a user of the procedure reaches one of these boxes by
following the logic of the procedure, a conclusion about the state of the subsystem of interest has
been reached.
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2.4.3 Assignment of Variable Names
To represent the logic leadingto the conclusionnamed9 in figure 2 in machine-processableform
we have assigneda Boolean (binary.valued)variable named 63a9 to the vertex labelled 9. In the
context of discussionin section 2.2 this variable is the consequent of the antecedent conditions on
the right-hand side(RHS) of equation (1) in section2.4.2. When the consequent hasthe value 1,the
propositionwithin the box is true, when it is 0, the propositionis false. Since antecedent and
consequenttermsare assigned names in an identical mannerwe will present an example of naming
onlya single variable. Each vertex withina procedure is assigneda variable namecomposed of the
procedurename, for example 63a, and a numericsuffix which isthe label of the vertex. This process
can be summarizedbythe followingproductionor rewriting rules.
[0] S"-_AABAC
[1] A-,'l1213141516171819
[2]B-"alblcl...IxlYlz
[31c--,81x
These rules specify a string of literals of length four or five. The first literal, represented by the firstA
in rule [0], indicates the chapter in the malfunction procedure handbook where the procedure can be
found. The second A indicates the page in the chapter. The third literal,B, indicates the procedure
within the SSV engineering discipline. The fourth literal,A, specifies the vertex containing the text of
the proposition. Finally, the fifth literal, C, specifies subpropositions which may be posed in
association with any single proposition as in the case of 63ala, 63alb, 63a 1c of figure 2. When no
subpropositions are represented, this literal evaluates to null represented by ;k. The application of
these rules is illustrated below in the generation of the variable name 63a9. The selective application
of these rules at each step beginning with the start symbol, S, rewrites the literal string, AABAC, to the
variable name 63a9.
S--*AABAC [0]
AABAC--*6ABAC [1]
6ABAC_63BAC [1]
63BAC_63aAC [2]
63aAC-*63a9C [l]
63a9C_63a9 [3]
The bracketed number after each step is the number of the rule applied at that step. The use of
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rewriting rules provides a systematic method of assigning names to variables the number of which
would rapidly become unmanageable if variable nameswere assigned in an ad hoc fashion. These
conventions assure that each variable will have a unique name and that every reference to any given
proposition (associated with a vertex) within a malfunction procedure will be made by the same name.
This is especially important since there are cross-references to the same vertex between the
malfunction procedures whereby one malfunction procedure branches into another.
2.4.4 Procedural Logic in Boolean Form
With a methodof assigning variable names, capturingthe logic of the procedure as a Boolean
function is trivial, Realizing that a Boolean function is equivalent to a path through the graph of the
malfunction procedure makes this immediatelyapparent. The numberof antecedent terms in the
resulting Booleanfunction is k-1 where k is the numberof verticesin the path; the path length iS
k- 1. Note that the consequent term of the function isan element of the path and contributesto the
size of k. The enumeration of a set of functions whichcovers or spans the malfunction procedure
canbe accomplishedby the simplerecursiveproceduredescribedbelow.
GENERATE(FUNCTION);
v _- NAME.OF(vertex);
N *- GET.NUMBER.OF.OUTPUT.ARCS;
if FUNCTION ~ = nil then LOGIC-AND 4- ' A " ;
else LOGIC-AND *- nil;
case 1: if N = 0 then
do;
FUNCTION *- v II - II FUNCTION;
output FUNCTION;
end;
case 2: else do until (N = 0);
N *- N-l;
if VALUE(arcN) = 'yes', or" nil then FUNCTION _-FUNCTIONIILOGIC-ANDIIv;
if VALUE(ar'cN) = 'no' then FUNCTION_-FUNCTIONIILOGIC-AND~IIv;
call NEXT.VERTEX;
call GENERATE(FUNCTION);
end:
return:
end GENERATE;
If this procedure is applied at the root of each malfunction procedure the result is a set of Boolean
functions like that in Table 3. We assume the existence of some other functions to service the
GET.NUMBER.OF.OUTPUT.ARCS, NAME.OF, VALUE. and NEXT.VERTEX calls. In particular,
GET.NUMBER.OF.OUTPUT.ARCSreturns 0, 1, or 2 for the various alternatives of nil, yes, or yes and
no. NAME.OF assigns a variable name to the vertex consistent with the rules of section 2.4.3,
NEXT.VERTEX follows the arc vi--*vi,__to the next vertex. This procedure is executed manually at
present although it could be implemented on a computer to support the automated design of
malfunction procedures.
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63a2= 63ala
63a4= 63alc A 63a3
63a6= 63alcA ~ 63a3A 63a5
63a7= 63a6
63a9= 63a1¢A ~ 63a3A ~ 63a5A 63a8
63al0 = 63a9
63a14= 63a13
63a15= 63alcA ~ 63a3A ~ 63a5A ~ 63a8A ~ 63all A 63a12A 63a14
63a18=63alcA ~ 63a3A ~ 63a5A ~ 63a8A 63all A 63a16A 63a17
63a19=63alcA ~ 63a3A ~ 63a5A ~ 63a8A ~ 63all A 63a16
63a20=63alcA ~ 63a3A ~ 63a5A ~ 63a8A 63all A 63a16A ~ 63a17
63a21= 63a19
63a21= 63a20
63a24=63a22A ~ 63a14A 63a12A ~ 63all A ~ 63a8A ~ 63a5A ~ 63a3A 63alc
63a25= ~ 63a22A ~ 63a14A 63a12A ~63all A ~ 63a8A ~ 63a5A
~ 63a3A 63alc
63a27= 63a26A 63a23A 63alb
63a28= 63a25
63a28= 63a15
63a30=63a29A ~ 63a26A 63a23A 63alb
63a33= ~ 63a32A 63a31A ~ 63a29A ~ 63a26A 63a23A 63alb
63a35=63a32A 63a31A ~ 63a29A ~ 63a26A 63a23A 63alb
63a36= 63a34bA ~ 63a31A ~ 63a29A ~ 63a26A 63a23A 63alb
63a37= 63a30
63a37= 63a33
63a37= 63a35
63a37= 63a38
63a38= 63a34aA ~ 63a31A ~63a29A ~ 63a26A 63a23A 63alb
63a39= 63a36
63a42= 63a41A 63a40A ~ 63a23A 63alb
63a43= ~ 63a41A 63a40A ~63a23A 63alb
63a44= 63a42
63a44= 63a47
63a47= 63a46A 63a45A ~ 63a40A ~ 63a23A 63alb
63a47= 63a46A 63a45A 6368
63a48= ~ 63a46A 63a45A ~ 63a40A ~ 63a23A 63alb
63a48= ~ 63a46A 63a45A 6368
63a50= 63a49bA ~ 63a45A ~ 63a40A ~ 63a23A 63alb
63a50=63a49bA ~ 63a45A 6368
63a51=63a50
63a52=63a49aA ~ 63a45A ~ 63a40A ~ 63a23A 63alb
63a52= 63a49aA ~ 63a45A 63bx8
63a53= 63a52
Table 3: CRYO 6.3a (figure 2) as Boolean Expressions
The conversion of the malfunction procedure to a set of Boolean expressions is equivalent to the
enumeration of the possible paths through the graph. While enumeration problems are associated
with classes of problems considered intractable [13] we are not faced, here, with the full enumeration
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problem since the set of paths for conversion to Boolean form is small and well.defined by virtue of
having been written down. This is the same as saying that the search space of the algorithm of
2.4.4 is small.
2.5 Software Implementation
Usingthe approach to variablenaming andlogic representationdescribedabove,a selectedsubset
of malfunctionprocedures wasimplemented ina convenienthigh.level language (HLL), ROSIE (Rule-
oriented Systemfor ImplementingExpertise) [27]. As used in thiswork, ROSIE is implementedon a
VAX 11/780 running the UNIX operating system. It should be noted that ROSIE was selected
primarilyas a matter of convenience and that thiswork does not require its use. Any programming
language could be used to implement the methods presented here. The principal advantages of
ROSIE are the interactive nature of the system,the existingsystemutilities for string manipulation,
and the relationalstructure of the underlyingdatabase system. These features present a powerful
developmentenvironment. The principal disadvantageis the largesystemoverhead associatedwith
the interpretive ROSIE language which is itself based on a dialect of LISP, INTERLISP.D. The
dependency on INTERLISP.D also limits the variety of systemson which ROSIE may be hosted at
present.
2.5.1 Organizing Principle
To retainthe terminologyfound in existingmalfunctionproceduresand, at the same time, retainthe
Booleanrepresentationcommonto both the softwareand hardwareimplementations,the information
contained in malfunction procedures was conveniently organized into three components. This
decomposition was suggested by the form of the Boolean functionsas shown in figure 6. As an
example, for the malfunction procedure, CRYO 6.3a, the rule.sets contain the following three
components:
1.63arhs - Antecedents. Contains the logic necessaryto determine the binary value of the
consequents of the Boolean expression. In general, this represents informationwhich
must be requested from the flight controller or the flight crew. The value of these
Boolean variables are potentially ascertainable from telemetry data. Grouping the
variables into this category essentiallyconstructsthe set of data which must be obtained
from some source external to the malfunction procdure itself.
2.63alhs - Consequents. Contains the inferential logic which determines the binary value
of the consequents as a function of the antecedents, Consequents are associated with
• either or both
a. diagnosis, the detection of a condition associated with the heavy, black bordered
boxes displayed in the original malfunction procedure document reproduced in
figure 6.
2]
b. action . the detection of a condition associated with a box in the original
procedure which requires human intervention or a change of vehicle state
necessary to provide further information or ensure vehicle safety before executing
the rest of the procedure.
3. 63aexp - Explanation. Contains the logic to interpret the values of the Boolean variables
into English text for presentation to the flight controllers or crew. This category uses
exactly the wording of the original malfunction procedure itself. This ability is a major
advantage in eliminating problems associated with introducing new terminology to a
highly specialized application.
This decomposition provides a strong organizational structure or paradigm for converting these rule-
sets into compiled, high-level languages such as FORTRAN or PASCAL as well as interpreted and
compilable languages like LISP. Tables 4, 5, 6 show the form each of these categories takes when
constructed as ROSIE rule.sets.
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Table 4; Partial Listing of 63aRHS
[4] if H2 Press is true obtain 63ala of "H2 P Normal"
[5] if 63ala is true go 63alhs.
[6] if 63ala is false obtain 63alb of "H2 P High"
[7] if 63alb is true obtain 63a23 of "TK3 and/or TK4 the affected tk".
[8] if 63alb is false obtain 63aic of "H2 P Low".
Table 5: Partial Listing of 63aLHS
[1] if (63ala is true) assert 63a2 is true.
[2] if (63aic is true and 63a3 is true) assert 63a4 is true.
[3] if (63alc is true and 63a3 is false and 63a5 is true)
assert 63a6 is true.
[4] if (63a6 is true) assert 63a7 is true.
Table 6: PartialListing of 63aEXP
[8] if 63ala is true send {"" All H2 P norm",return}.
[9] if 63alb is true send {"" H2 P High",return,
"" ACTION: Deact htrs in affected tk(s).",return,
" (RI) H2 TKI(2,3) HTRS A,B OFF and/or",return,
" (A11) CRYO TK4 HTR H2 A,B - OFF",RETURN}.
[10] if 63aic is true send {"" H2 P low",return}.
[11] if 63a2 is true send {"" DIAGNOSIS: C/W Failure",return}.
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2.6 Hardware Implementation
The reasonthatwediscussthetopicof hardwareimplementationatallisto pointouttheconceptof
hardware-equivalence. By virtueof the use of Booleanformalismwe are able to representthe
completelogicof the malfunctionprocedureas if itwerea programmab/e/ogic array (PLA). This
meansthat procedurallogiccontainedin the malfunctionprocedurescan be transformedto a
bit-map whichis independentof the methodor languageof implementation.Sincethe bit.map is
essentiallya truth.tablewitha standardstructure,describedbelow,a singleprocessoror program
can beconstructedwhichprocessesthesetables. Byadoptingthisrepresentationwe eliminatethe
needfor a largesoftwaresystemwhichwouldbe necessaryto captureand processthe logicof a
largenumberof malfunctionproceduresandpermitheprocessingof thesameproceduralogicat
the level of register.registeroperations. This impliesnot only significantlyreduced storage
requirementsbut also veryhighprocessingspeeds. The next fewsectionssummarizethe steps
necessarytoconvertBooleanexpressionsto theirPLAformandpresentheresultsof an actualPLA
synthesis.
2.6.1 Generationof Hardware Descriptions
Once the malfunctionprocedurehas been specifiedin Booleanform, the processof creating
descriptionsof hardwarewhich are functionallyequivalentto the malfunctionprocedureis
straightforward.A set of Booleanequationscanbe translatedintointegratedcircuitsthroughan
automatedseriesof translationsbetweendifferentintermediaterepresentations.Each of the
representationsi a descriptionofa differentaspectof the implementationprocess.Inthiscase,the
Booleanequationswillbe convertedintoa truthtablewhichissometimesreferredto asapersona/ity
matrix. Thetruthtablewillbe translatedintoan architectureknownas an AND.ORprogrammable
logicarray(AND-ORPLA). (In the remainderof thisdiscussion,thetermPLAwillbe usedto mean
AND.ORPLA.)ThePLAcanbeimplementedasa customintegratedcircuit.Figure7 summarizesthe
sequenceof stepsleadingfromtheBooleanfunctionstothe manufactureof the hardwaredevice.
Mostof thesestepsare implementedusing programsdevelopedin the Universityof California,
Berkeley,ComputerScienceDivision[20]. Thenamesof the majorprogramsinvolvedare listedin
figure7 accordingto theirroleinthesequentialdesignandmanufactureof a VSLIdevice. Although
one can actuallygeneratea semiconductordevicewhich executesthe logicof the malfunction
procedure,as shownbelow,to do so probablyis impracticalfor mostof the kindsof procedures
currentlyexisting,due to the volatilenatureof theseproceduresand the consequentfrequent
changesmadeto them. Whilethe redesignof thesedeviceswouldbe trivial,themanufactureand
integrationofthe resultantdeviceswouldnotbe generallycost.effective.A smallsubsetof highly
stableprocedurescould possiblybe identifiedfor hardwareimplementation.
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* Boolean Expressions
63ax2 = 63axl
63ax4 = 63axlc &(~63ax5)&63ax8
eqntott 1
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* Bit Map
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ARPANET 3
* Chip Manufacture
MOSIS
Figure 7: Design and Manufacture Sequence for VLSI Devices
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2.6.2 Reductionof BooleanFunctionsto NormalForm
The design automationprogram eqntott generates a personalitymatrix suitable for PLA
programmingfroma setof BooleanfunctionsthatdefinethePLAoutputsintermsof itsinputs.Table
3 displaysthe inputto eqntott while figure8 showsthe resultingpersona/ity matrix and the PLA
resultingfromthatmatrixasdescribedinsection2.6.4. A personalitymatrixis a representationof a
set of Booleanfunctionsin disjunctive norma/ form (DNF) that definesa templatefor a circuit
implementationof thosefunctions.
2.6.3 Minterms, Truth-tables and PLAs
Disjunctive normal form expresses Boolean functions as sums of products or minterms. The
interested reader is directed to [31] for further discussion of normal forms for Boolean functions. One
method of organizing information contained in Boolean functions in general and functions in DNF in
particular is through the use of a truth-table. The mathematical term for a row in a truth table is a
minterm. A truth table is an enumeration of the output values of a set of Boolean equations for a
given set of in )utvalues. For example, the truth table for the Boolean function a/k (bV c) is
a b c out.
0 0 0 0
001 0
010 0
011 0
100 0
101 I
110 I
111 1
Each minterm is the conjunction (logical AND) of one or more terms. The second row of this truth
table is a minterm whose value is 0 if a is 0 and b is 0 and c is 1. A truth table can be reduced in size
by the use of don't care terms. A don't care term is represented by '-' in the truth table. One possible
truth table for a/k (bV ¢)using don't care terms is
a b c I out
o--I o
1001 0
ii I i
1- 1 I 1
The truth table representationand the PLA architecturewere chosen for their close similarities,
2.6.4 Interpretation of the Personality Matrix
The personality matrix consists of a line for each sum of products term, implicant, which begins with
that implicant followed by the values of the various outputs. The implicant is composed of a single
character (0, 1. or -) for each input variable in the conventionalfashion descibed in section 2.6.3.
The output values are represented by one of three characters (0, 1, or x). The PLA architecture is
physically similar to the truth table, in addition to implementingit functionally. The AND.OR PLA has
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-0-0-0................................ 000000000000000000000000000000001
...................... 0 i---1- 000000000000000000000000000000110
.................................. 0 I-I--- O00000000000000000000000000011000
........................................ I--0- I 000000000000000000000000000100000
...................... I-I I 000000000000000000000000011000000
............... Ol....................... 000000100000000000000000000000000
.............. I................... 000000100000000000000000000000000
-0-01--0-0-0-0 .... I............................. 000000000101000000000000000000000
-0-01--0-0-0-01 ......................................... 000000010000000100000000000000000
-0-01--0-0-01 .....I--0.................................. 000000000011000000000000000000000
-0-01--0-0-01 ..... I-I................................... 000000001000000000000000000000000
-0-01--0-01 ............................................. 000011000000000000000000000000000
-0-01--01............................................... 001100000000000000000000000000000
-0-01-I................................................. 010000000000000000000000000000000
-01--0 0 0---0............ I- 000000000000000000000000000000110
-01--0................... 0........... 0---0.......... I--- 000000000000000000000000000011000
-01--0................... 0 -0--I--0 000000000000000000000000000100000
-01--0................... 0 0--I-1 000000000000000000000000011000000
-01--0................... 0.......... 1--0 000000000000000000000000100000000
-01--0 0 I-I 000000000000000000000001010000000
-01--0 I--0-0-0 I 000000000000000000001100000000000
-01--0 ..........I--0-0-0 .............. 1......... 000000000000000000010010000000000
-01--0 1--0-01--0 000000000000000001001000000000000
-01--0 1--0-01-1 000000000000000000101000000000000
-01--0 1--01 000000000000000010001000000000000
-01--0 1-1............................. 000000000000001000000000000000000
--I-I................................................... 000000000000000000000000000000001
1--0-0.................................................. 100000000000000000000000000000000
1---I............................. 000000000000000000000000000000001.
1-1..................................................... 000000000000000000000000000000001
Figu re 8: Disjunctive Normal Form Matrix and Corresponding Circuit Topology
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two parts that are each implemented as planar portions of the (planar) integrated circuit. These
portions are called the and-plane and the or.plane. The and-plane lies adjacent to the or-plane in the
same way that the input portion of a truth table lies adjacent to the output portion. The and-plane and
or.plane have the same number of rows. Each row contains the circuitry to calculate one of the
minterms from the truth table.
2.6.5 True and Complement Format
Each pair of columns in the AND-plane contributes the true and complement of an input variable to
each of the appropriate minterms. A 1 contributes the true form of the input variable, a 0 contributes
the complement of the input variable. A minterm is calculated by anding the appropriate form of each
input variable that is selected by a 1 or a 0 in that row. An - in the truth table indicates that the input
variable does not contribute anything to the minterm. For example, the third row in the reduced truth
table above indicates that the third minterm is calculated by anding the true form of a with the true
form of b and that neither the true nor complement of c is used. Each column in the OR.plane
specifies an output variable. The output from a column is the logical OR of 0 with each minterm that
is selected by the presence of a one in that column.
2.6.6 Comparing Logical and Physical Domain Formats
The reduction, by eqntott, of the set of Boolean functions into disjunctive normal form creates a
matrix (bit-map) describing the normal form which is directly comparable to the physical realization of
the PLA in terms of integrated circuit mask layers, To illustrate this, figure 8 displays both the
truth.table for malfunction procedure CRYO 6.3a and the resulting PLA. They have been lined-up to
show the data format of the disjunctive normal form of the truth.table juxtaposed with the
corresponding circuit topology of the PLA. The ones in the left.hand part of the matrix are reflected in
a connection to the true input column in the circuit, the zeros in the left.hand part of the matrix are
reflected in a connection to the complemented inputcolumn in the circuit, and the ones in the
right-hand part of the matrix are reflected in a connection to the output column in the circuit. The
zeroes in the right-hand part of the matrix specifies no connection to the physical output column in
the circuit.
2.6.7 PLA Performance Analysis
The circuit description can be analyzed for area, timing, and power dissipation characteristics, and
can be simulated, with esim; see figure 7. as a further validation of the conversion from procedural to
Boolean form.
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cryo6.eqn
Design Style Area (square microns) Power Dissipation (W) Worst Delay (ns)
' nMOS PEA (cis) 1176480 .115 (.065) 29.8
nMOS PEA (trans) 1247688 .115 (.065) 29.8
CMOS PLA (cis) 5031180 N/A N/A
CMOS PEA (trans) 4374832 N/A N/A
Figure 9: Automated Analysis of Implementation Characteristics of CRYO 6.3a
Equations.
3 Distributed Architecture
Previoussectionshave concentratedon the representationand implementationof procedural logic
usingnew approaches and new technology. Greater benefits may be realizedfrom these techniques
than from simple machine processing. We have demonstrated the equivalence of hardware
representationsto the logical representationof the originalmalfunctionprocedure. Based on these
discussions the benefits such an approach may have for the increasing distribution of mission
processingbetweenspace and groundas wellas betweenhardware andsoftware,are apparent.
3.0.1 Characteristics of Distributed Architectures
Distributedprocessingarchitectureshavegeneral charactersticswhich can be seen to be lacking
from the current SSV ADP architecture, although most of ihese characteristics can be found in the
operations network as a whole. Discussion here is limited to the characteristics of the ADP
architecturefor missionsupport. As discussedin [8], theseinclude:
processing supported by a network which provideshigh.level controlover inter-process
communicationin a standard,network.wideprotocol.
- communication strictly between asynchronous processes as opposed to mere remote
data access.
• data access accomplished via inter-process communication.
• resource sharing not limited to data-sharing and especially including sharing of
processing in support of a single task.
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3.1 Limitations of the Current Communications Architecture
inthe past, unlessa space vehicle was in view of a ground.basedtracking station, which was only
15-20% of the time during an orbit for mannedspaceflights, space/ground communicationwas not
possible. Duringthe time when spacecraft wereblacked-out of communicationwiththe ground,all of
the data which the craft may have been collecting regarding its on-board systems, experiments or
external sensors had to be stored on-board. Only when communication was re-established could
data be communicated (transmited/received) with the ground. This situation is changing inasmuch
as the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) is anticipated, when fully operational, to
permit communication with the ground for 80-85% of a given flight.
3.2 Limitations of Current On-board Processing Architecture
Historically, the tasks performed in support of manned space flight have been distributed between
the on.board General Purpose Computers (GPCs) and the ground computers. This physical
separation was also a logical separation of processing responsibility, largely the result of the limited
space.ground communication. Tighter logical sharing of processing was restricted not merely by the
physical separation of the processors but fundamentally by the isolation resulting from low
transmission speeds and irregular opportunity for communication due to limited ground coverage.
This approach has been perpetuated in the SSVdata processing systems. Within the current system
architecture, the on-board General Purpose Computers (GPCs) perform these major functions [17]:
1. guidance, navigation and control of the SSVthrough ascent, on.orbit, and landing,
2. systems management which includes software to acquire, process and route data for
systemsevaluation and management,
3. payload software which permits the modification of the contents of mass memory units
(MMUs), and loading of the software to support display electronics units (DEUs).
The software to support these functions must be completely prepared and loaded on the MMU prior to
launch. There is extremely limited variation of systemprocessing once a launch has been executed.
Alteration of the MMU processing sequence can be accomplished only through the use of single
commands to the processor in the form of GPC instructions or data. These commands must be built
manually by either the flight crew or the controllers on the ground. For the purposes of malfunction
procedure processing, the GPCs act only as the interface between the flight team and the vehicle
systems and subsystems. The GPCs themselves do not have the capacity to support extensive
anomaly processing.
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3.3 Effect of Limitations on SSV Autonomy
These two factors, limitedcommunications and limited on-board processing, apply opposing forces
in attemptsto achieve increasedSSV autonomy. On the one handlimited communicationsmakes it
desirable to provide as much stand-alone capabilityon.board as possible. On the other hand, the
• desire for high reliability of the SSV systems, in the face of high SSV system complexity, requires the
expertise of more than just the flight crew for both nominal and off-nominal operations. The addition
of computers and software to support increased vehicle autonomy is not simple. Since the existing
computer systems are flight-critical, the alteration of their operational capabilities is an expensive
undertaking, and also subject to high schedule risk due to the nature of software development. This
is not, however, an impossible or even impractical goal. One method for additional processing
on.board, without requiring the alteration of existing on-board systems, is through the use of carry.on
micrcomputers. If we assume that the problem of additional processing is solvable, and it is, still to be
faced is the more difficult problem of capturing the collective expertise of the flight control team in a
computing system. The improvement in space-ground communications represented by TDRSS
makes this expertise more accessible to the flight crew but does change the very labor intensive
character of mission monitoring nor does it alone increase vehicle autonomy.
3.4 Options for System Architecture and Interconnections
The ability to select the mode of implementation,software or hardware, as well as the location,
space or ground, offers four options for any given system design attempting to the flight control
function. Theseare indicated in figure 10. The choices are not mutua//y exc/usive. This fact implies
the slightlymoresubtle point, however,that the methodspresentedin this paper make it possibleand
relatively simpletask incorporate significant increases in redundancyand autonomyfor procedural
processing,with all the attendant benefits and withoutgreat cost. This can be accomplished with a
single logical representationand in an automatedfashion. The importance of these resultscan be
seen by envisioninga spacecraft which, when normallyin contactwiththe ground, is monitoredby an
automatic malfunction processing system staffed by humans but which is capable of going
autonomous for the same function when, for any reason,it isout of communicationwiththe ground.
31
I Boolean I
Functions
Software Hardware
User I
Figu re 10: Distributed Processing Architecture: Software and Hardware
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4 Summary
We have presented a new method for the representation of SSV malfunction procedures which
permit their conversion to a form suitable for processing by computers. These results are derived
from [15] which originated this representation for the development of a rule-based expert system
capable of automatic inference and the implementation of higher.level logic than that contained in the
malfunction procedures. Additionally we have presented the concept of hardware equivalence and
discussed the implications of the distribution of procedural processing between hardware and
software aswetl as space and ground. The results of this work stand-alone in that this representation
can be implemented based soley on the results presented in this paper and independent of any
further work to develop an expert Systembased on them.
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